Physics and National Security: Of Missiles, Mines, and Morality

I was surprised that in their otherwise excellent article "The Continuing Debate on National Missile Defenses" Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, and David C. Wright (Physics Today, December 2000, page 36) did not mention one of the more serious problems associated with the NMD system as currently envisaged: The ground-based interceptor (GBI) rockets it will use are about the size of the proposed small intercontinental ballistic missile of the 1980s and will have similar launch signatures and flight characteristics. Since the NMD firing doctrine will require multiple (probably two to four) GBI launches per credible target—that is, disguised warheads and decoys—even a small rogue-country attack against the US could involve the salvo firing of dozens of GBIs. Add to this a possible attack from the Middle East that might necessitate firing the interceptors on a course toward western Russia (especially if the interceptors were based in North Dakota), and one begins to worry about the capability of Russia's decaying missile warning system to make a timely and correct assessment of the situation.

If the US proceeds with NMD, it should consider measures to lessen the chances that Russia, detecting what could seem to be a US surprise attack, would launch its missiles in defense. Sharing early-warning data, as is now being discussed, would be a good start, but providing Russia with an ability to monitor NMD communications channels and the right to inspect GBIs should also be considered.

Gronlund, Lewis, and Wright reply: We have not investigated the extent to which Russia might mistake a launch of national missile defense (NMD) interceptors for that of offensive US missiles, but this is not an idle concern: In 1995, a scientific research rocket fired from Norway was detected by Russia's early warning system and triggered a false alarm that traveled all the way up the chain of command to President Boris Yeltsin. Moreover, as Allen Thomson notes, Russia's early warning system is deteriorating.

But there is a more fundamental way in which the US deployment of an NMD system could increase the risk of Russia's launching its nuclear armed missiles in response to a mistaken warning of an incoming US attack.

The US and Russia both maintain large numbers of nuclear-tipped missiles that can be launched within minutes. Such a launch-on-warning posture is risky at best, but Russia's deteriorating warning system exacerbates the dangers. Because a mistaken attack from Russia is one of the greatest nuclear dangers to the US, our government should be doing everything in its power to encourage Russia to reduce its launch-on-warning capability. Yet, US deployment of a missile defense that Russia believes might be able to intercept a significant fraction of its survivable missiles will instead serve as an incentive for Russia to maintain this dangerous capability.

This linkage between US missile defenses and Russian launch-on-warning policy was demonstrated clearly in leaked US State Department documents used in the January 2000 US-Russia negotiations to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to permit deployment of the planned NMD system.¹ State Department officials argued that the system would not threaten Russia's deterrent as long as Russia continued to deploy 1000 or more nuclear warheads and maintained the ability to launch promptly on warning of a US attack.

Reference

1. 1. The US State Department document The ABM Treaty "Talking Points": Russia's Concerns is on the Web site of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at [LINK].

In the article on the evolving battlefield by John S. Foster and Larry D. Welch (Physics Today, December 2000, page 31), I was pleased to see mention of landmine detection using nuclear quadrupole resonance (QR) spectroscopy,¹ a technology that shows great promise. In four DARPA-sponsored blind field tests conducted last year, including one in Bosnia, QR-based systems detected and located all of the mines with no false alarms.

Those demonstrations represent a significant increase in performance over systems in current use. The main difficulty in landmine detection has been the high rate of false alarms, not detection sensitivity per se. Current systems yield a great many false alarms for every mine detected, which leads to wasted time digging up metal debris or even rocks. Time thus spent increases stress fatigue, mistakes, and potential exposure to hostile forces. The compound specificity of QR, mentioned in passing by Foster and Welch, means QR detects only bulk explosives and, thus, only true hazards.

QR technology is also being used to scan luggage, mail, and parcels for the presence of explosives; combined with other drug scanning methods, it is also capable of detecting cocaine and heroin in their various forms.

While I agree with Foster and Welch that "efficient, reliable, and affordable approaches" are required to meet the challenges, I must point out that QR detection systems are not inherently expensive. All the basic elements of such systems are contained in amateur radio transceivers, which sell in quantity for considerably less than $5000.

Reference

1. 1. A. D. Hibbs et al., in Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets V (Proc. of SPIE, no. 4038), A. C. Dubey et al., eds., SPIE, Bellingham, Wash., (2000), p. 564.

Never before have I reacted so strongly to an article in Physics Today. "The Evolving Battlefield" by John S. Foster and Larry D. Welch may be a reality that cannot be dismissed out of our wishes for a more peaceful world; however, my negative reaction stems from a moral element to the article.

Essentially 99% of the article pertained to changing technology needs for national security with a dubious amount of relevance to the physics that the reader is expecting. The conclusion, however, was a feel-good appeal to scientists who may decide to use their talents to "improve the human condition," as the authors put it.

Outside the ivory tower, many people don't believe it is a net positive to wage battles without offensive combatant losses or to have pinpoint accuracy destructive power hundreds of miles from the target. Perhaps the V-2 rocket was the first unmanned weapon to have long-range accuracy. This was considered a machine of terror, not just a weapon of war.

Certainly smart weapons kill fewer unintended victims, but that should never be confused with improving the human condition. If scientists wish to use their abilities to build more effective and efficient killing machines, then they should do so without cloaking it in some fabricated moral justification.

It was sadly ironic that the true millennium ended with the special issue of Physics Today (December 2000) featuring contributions on future challenges for physics and technology in warfare. Sidney Drell says that "history teaches us that new technologies have had a major influence on the structure, tactics, and strategies of military forces, and that technological advantage can prove decisive to the outcome of military conflicts." Although military battles clearly may be won with technology, history shows that military forces with extraordinary technological and economic advantages do little to end mankind's fundamental conflicts and that arms and violence beget arms and violence; consider, for example, the conflicts in the Middle East, Ireland, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Africa—and even the failed high-tech "war on drugs." Furthermore, history shows that the true end of conflict comes with interdependence, communication, education, and economic prosperity. These are not the present objectives of our national defense budget.

The continuing overwhelming focus on weapons and military technology ignores history and prevents interdependence. The cell phone and Internet will likely do far more to ensure future peace than any gadgets developed at seemingly unlimited expense by scientists working on secret defense projects. The biggest contributions that the scientific community can make for world peace are to encourage young scientists and engineers to shun military work; to focus on the challenges in energy, civilian communication, and the environment; and to promote leaders who recognize these priorities.

Drell replies: The last section of my introductory article—A special responsibility—briefly touches on that very issue, asking each physicist to define his or her own response to the important challenges raised by applications of scientific advances.